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ABSTRACT 
As e-commerce becomes more prevalent, states increasingly 
struggled to collect use taxes. Residents who purchase products 
online are subject to the use tax; however, they rarely report the use 
tax they owe because many are unaware that such a tax exists. States 
are constitutionally unable to impose use tax collection duties on 
many online retailers, because there must be a substantial physical 
nexus between the state and the retailer to do so.  This Note 
considers the current practices that states employ in use tax 
collection, and examines the three different methods that purportedly 
allow for states to impose use tax collection duties on online 
retailers, even without a substantial physical nexus. This Note 
proposes that states should continue to utilize the tools and practices 
available to them in a more efficient way for use tax collection rather 
than create a new tax scheme as the three methods propose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Panic struck Californian consumers in early September 2012 as a 
law requiring certain Internet companies to more efficiently collect the 
sales and use taxes owed on e-commerce transactions teetered on the 
precipice of effectiveness.1  Californians increased their spending by 
eight to ten percent on the merchant website Amazon in the thirty days 
preceding the effective date of the law,2 not realizing that their online 
purchases were already subject to use tax that had simply remained 
unreported and uncollected.3 Every state with a sales tax also has a 
corresponding use tax at the same rate,4 which is applied to items that 
were bought out-of-state but used within the state.5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Andrea Chang, Californians Spend Freely On Amazon.com Before Sales 
Tax Deadline, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ 
sep/05/business/la-fi-amazon-shopping-spree-20120905. 
 2. See Jane Wells, Binge Buying in California Before the ‘Amazon Tax,’ CNBC 
(Sept. 13 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49023713/Binge_Buying_in_ 
California_Before_the_039Amazon_Tax039. 
     3. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6201, 6201.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 
Reg. Sess.). 
 4. See Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the Context of Declining 
State Sales Tax Bases, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1373, 1374 (2000), available at 
http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax%5Cntjrec.nsf/1ED27F6240C4EF0B85256AFC007F33C3/$FIL
E/v53n4p31373.pdf. 
 5. See David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable 
Application of State Sales Tax to Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 335, 338–39 (2011). 
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Throughout the last century, states have attempted to expand their 
taxing powers by mandating that businesses collect sales and use taxes;6 
however, the Supreme Court has limited states’ power to burden certain 
companies with this additional obligation.7  The Court has held that 
there must be a substantial physical nexus between the state and the 
entity upon which the state wishes to impose this duty.8  However, the 
rapid development of the Internet and e-commerce has increased 
consumers’ ability to shop from remote vendors that lack the necessary 
substantial physical nexus with their home states.9 As a result, less tax 
has been collected.10 
To increase the amount of taxes actually collected, some states 
began implementing tax laws targeted at e-commerce businesses such as 
Amazon.11  These laws became known as “Amazon tax laws” and 
created a substantial physical nexus between remote vendors and their 
affiliates when certain conditions were met.12  Some of these laws have 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Chris Atkins, Establishing Physical Presence: Borders Online Case 
Reveals Court Disharmony in Applying Physical Presence Rules to State Sales Taxes, 
TAX FOUNDATION (Sept. 26, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article/establishing-
physical-presence-borders-online-case-reveals-court-disharmony-applying-physical. 
 7. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Nat’l Geographic 
Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (overruling the due process analysis of 
Nat’l Bellas Hess, but expanding on its commerce clause analysis); Scripto, Inc. v. 
Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 
(1944); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
 8. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15. 
 9. See Atkins, supra note 6. 
 10. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 339. 
 11. See id. at 343–44. 
 12. See William V. Vetter, Conjuring Jurisdiction Through Presumption–Affiliate 
Nexus Legislation, 21 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 6, 9–10 (2012) (“If (a) the 
seller/alleged tax collector meets all the following conditions: 1 Has no political or 
physical nexus with the state. 2 Sells tangible goods or services that eventually become 
subject to use tax in the state. 3 Has an agreement with a state resident to provide any 
consideration in exchange for the resident’s direct or indirect referral of a potential 
customer to the seller. 4 Has cumulative gross receipts exceeding $10,000 during the 
preceding four quarterly periods ending on the last day of February, May, August, and 
November from state residents referred by all persons described in item (3).  Then, (b) 
the seller/alleged tax collector is presumed to be soliciting business in the state through 
an independent contractor or other representative and, therefore, must act as the state’s 
use tax collector.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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been challenged in court under the Due Process or Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution.13  At least one court has held that an Amazon tax law 
was unconstitutional.14  Amazon’s responses to the laws have ranged 
from making deals with the state to postpone effective start dates of the 
laws to terminating the affiliate programs within states enacting such 
laws.15 
As negative consequences resulting from the Amazon tax laws 
have developed, such as not allowing certain states to reap the benefits 
of e-commerce affiliate programs, alternative tax schemes have been 
proposed to mandate e-commerce companies to collect sales and use tax 
while conforming to the law.16  A proposal by Travis Cavanaugh is 
similar to that of the Amazon tax law structure; he proposes that the 
substantial physical nexus be created by the relationship between the e-
commerce company and the customers that use the websites as a market 
to sell goods.17  Cavanaugh’s proposal of the Intermediary Tax is based 
on the idea that there is a stronger physical nexus argument between the 
customers that use a website as a market rather than the affiliates that 
use a website as a contractor.18  David Gamage and Devin Heckman 
have proposed another alternative: the “Adequate Vendor 
Compensation” scheme.19  They propose that states can mandate e-
commerce companies to collect sales and use taxes if states completely 
compensate the companies for their burdens.20 This proposal attempts to 
satisfy the current legal standards without additionally burdening 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Performance Mktg. Ass’n v. Hamer, No. 2011 CH 26333, 2012 WL 
2090791 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 7, 2012); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation 
& Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010). 
 14. See Performance Mktg., 2012 WL 2090791. 
 15. See David Streitfeld, Amazon, Forced to Collect Tax, Is Adding Roots, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at A1; Associates Program Operating Agreement, 
AMAZONASSOCIATES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://affiliate-program.amazon.com/gp/ 
associates/agreement?ie=UTF8&pf_rd_i=assoc_footer_content_newlogin&pf_rd_m=A
TVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_p=&pf_rd_r=&pf_rd_s=assoc-center-
1&pf_rd_t=501&ref_=amb_link_359035362_10. 
 16. See Travis Cavanaugh, Note, Iowa Can Do Better Than the Affiliate Tax: A 
Proposal for an Intermediary Tax, 97 IOWA L. REV. 567 (2012); David Gamage & 
Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 483, 484 (2012). 
 17. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484. 
 20. See id. at 503. 
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companies in their efforts to collect the state sales tax.21 The argument 
behind this proposal has not been supported by any court.22  The states 
that do currently collect sales and use taxes employ two main methods 
to collect use tax:  through the state’s individual income tax return and a 
separate use tax return.23 
This Note argues that some of the current practices utilized by 
states could be employed more efficiently to increase use tax 
compliance.  Part I of this Note examines the legal background of states’ 
consumer use tax collection.  This Part further provides the current legal 
parameters that must be met for a state to mandate that a company 
collect sales and use tax.  It also discusses what a use tax is and what the 
states’ powers are in directing companies to collect these taxes.  Finally, 
Part I discusses the evolution of use tax collection law as it pertains to 
remote vendors. 
Part II of this Note provides an analysis of the Amazon tax laws, 
Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal, and Gamage’s and Heckman’s 
Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal.24  It also examines states’ 
current efforts to collect the use tax.  This Part further describes each tax 
scheme’s implementation and the respective potential positive and 
negative consequences associated with each methodology. Finally, Part 
II analyzes the various practices that states employ to collect use tax and 
discusses the positive and negative effects of each scheme. 
Part III of this Note argues that states have the ability to increase 
consumer use tax compliance by implementing tools already available to 
them.  This Part maintains that states should use these practices rather 
than create an entirely new, and potentially illegal, tax scheme.  Part III 
compares the consequences of implementing one of the new tax 
schemes surveyed above to those of current state practices. 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 516. 
 23. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, Research Dep’t, Minn. House of 
Representatives, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other States (Apr. 
2012), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf. 
 24. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484; 
Vetter, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
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I. USE TAX BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW 
Sales and use taxes first appeared in various states’ tax codes in the 
beginning of the twentieth century.25  To date, forty-five states have 
sales and use taxes.26  The collection of these taxes has proved to be 
extremely important to each state’s tax bases.27  As a result, the power of 
the states’ to compel companies to collect these taxes has become a 
debated issue over the years.28  Part I of this Note provides an overview 
of the nature of sales and use taxes, as well as explains the judicial 
evolution of the states’ limitations of taxing power over remote 
vendors.29  Subsection A discusses the distinctions between sales and 
use taxes and describes the current tax landscape across the country.  
Subsection A also describes the development of the states’ powers and 
limits imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses regarding 
taxing remote vendors.  Subsection B briefly discusses the due process 
requirements for a state to tax certain parties.  Subsection C details the 
evolution of the power to impose tax collection by remote vendors 
within the frame of the Commerce Clause. Finally, Subsection D 
discusses the most recent Supreme Court decision, Quill Corporation v. 
North Dakota, regarding sales and use tax collection on remote vendors. 
A. SALES AND USE TAXES 
Most states impose sales and use taxes on property,30 though the 
two taxes, both resulting from economic transactions, are distinct.31  
Sales taxes are imposed on property that is purchased within the state, 
while use taxes are “tax[es] on the enjoyment of that which is 
purchased.”32 Each state that imposes a sales tax also has a 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Atkins, supra note 6, at 1. 
 26. See Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Taxes at Midyear 2012, TAX 
FOUNDATION (July 31, 2012), available at http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-
local-sales-taxes-midyear-2012. 
 27. See STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41853, STATE TAXATION OF 
INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 1 (2011). 
 28. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 29. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 30. Currently, forty-five states levy statewide sales and use taxes.  Alaska, 
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon are the five states that do not. See 
Drenkard, supra note 26. 
 31. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 135 (2d ed. 1962). 
 32. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). 
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corresponding use tax.33 To prevent consumers being taxed twice, 
generally when a sales tax is applied the purchase becomes exempt from 
use tax.34  Sales and use taxes thus can be mutually exclusive.35  Use 
taxes are calculated by applying the current sales tax rate on the item 
purchased online or in another state and subtracting the amount of taxes 
already paid within that state or online.36 
The sales and use tax rates vary from state to state.37  Because of 
the incongruities of the states’ tax systems, multistate businesses operate 
in a complex environment.38  The Multistate Tax Compact created the 
Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”), “an intergovernmental state tax 
agency working on behalf of the states and taxpayers,”39 whose mission 
it was to encourage a more uniform tax system across the states.40  
Similarly, the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board (“SSTGB”) is an 
organization dedicated to creating a more efficient sales and use tax 
system.41  The SSTGB created the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement between twenty-four states aiming to lessen the burden of 
complying with the tax rules by fostering a more consistent tax system 
between the states.42 
States that collect sales and use taxes rely heavily on the collection 
of those taxes.43  Approximately one-third of the states’ budgets are 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1803, 1806 (2012). 
 34. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (1944) (“The 
use of property the sale of which is subject to Iowa's sales tax is exempted from the use 
tax, but the sales tax can be laid only on sales at retail within the State.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 35. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1. 
 36. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 2. 
 37. See MAGUIRE, supra note 27. 
 38. See About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013) (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)). 
 39. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=40 (last visited 
May 22, 2013). 
 40. See id. 
 41. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, supra note 38. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See generally NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & THE NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET 
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES (2011). 
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derived from sales tax.44  States lose approximately $10 billion of taxes 
from e-commerce due to the complications of collecting sales and use 
taxes from those transactions such as the fact that states cannot force 
companies to collect sales or use taxes without a physical nexus between 
the state and the retailer.45  States therefore need a more effective way to 
collect sales and use taxes on e-commerce purchases than the current 
standard. 
B. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND TAXATION 
The latest Supreme Court case to opine on the taxation of remote 
vendors, Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, suggests that there are two 
due process requirements for state sales and use tax laws to legally reach 
the covered transactions.46  The first is “some minimum connection[] 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”47  
The second is “that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes 
must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State.’”48  
As Due Process Clause interpretation has evolved in its view of judicial 
jurisdiction, the minimum connection required between state tax laws 
and businesses has transformed as well.49 
In 1945, the Supreme Court held in International Shoe v. 
Washington50 that for a forum state to have jurisdiction over a defendant, 
the defendant must have “minimum contacts that arise out of or are 
connected to the forum state.”51  The Court subsequently held in Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz in 1985 that it was not necessary for a 
commercial entity to have a physical connection to the state to create 
jurisdiction if the commercial entity “‘purposefully directed’ [its efforts] 
toward residents of [that] state.”52  In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See id. at ix (“Within state budgets, about 40 percent of general fund revenue is 
from personal income tax, 33 percent is from sales tax, and seven percent is from 
corporate tax, with the rest from various other sources.”). 
 45. See Michael Mazerov, Should States Require Online Retailers to Collect Sales 
Tax?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204528204577007511298359048.html. 
 46. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 47. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
 48. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. G. D. Bair, 437 U.S. 
267, 273 (1978)). 
 49. See id. 
 50. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 51. Id. at 316. 
 52. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
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Court ruled that due to the evolution of Due Process law, it is 
unnecessary for a commercial entity to have a physical connection with 
a state in order to establish an “imposition of a duty to collect a use tax” 
on the commercial entity.53 
To meet due process standards for sales and use tax, the Supreme 
Court maintained that the “dissociation” between business transactions 
and states does not hinder the states’ ability to mandate certain 
companies to collect use taxes.54  The opinion of the Court was not that 
the use tax must have some connection between the seller’s transaction 
and “the seller’s activity within the state.”55  Use taxes satisfy due 
process standards for sales and use tax because these taxes are related to 
items consumers use within the state lines.56  Individual states have 
imposed sales and use taxes since the Great Depression, and courts have 
upheld their ability to do.57  Thus, the central issue is not whether remote 
vendors can be taxed, but rather whether they are mandated to collect 
use taxes from state residents that will be using the products within the 
state.58 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF USE TAX JURISPRUDENCE 
In 1944, the Supreme Court delivered two opinions on cases 
concerning sales and use taxes on remote vendors.59  These cases, 
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co and General Trading Co. v. State Tax 
Commission of Iowa, were pivotal to the development of state sales and 
use tax policies as the Court defined the constitutional boundaries of the 
states’ abilities to compel companies to collect sales and use tax.60  The 
Court specifically relied on the Commerce Clause to support its findings 
that states could not impose “tax[ation] on the privilege of doing 
interstate business.”61 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
 54. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 331 (1944). 
 57. See Amelia Landenberger, Note, How Battles Over Collection of Sales Taxes 
on Online Sales Will Affect Small Businesses-Especially Affiliates of Large Sellers Like 
Amazon.com, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 225, 225 (2012). 
 58. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944). 
 59. See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335. 
 60. See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 327; Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 335. 
 61. Gen. Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338. 
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In McLeod, the state of Arkansas sought to tax the sales 
transactions between its residents and a Tennessee corporation.62  The 
corporation did not have any physical connections with Arkansas; it 
solicited customers within Arkansas through its sales employees located 
within Tennessee via telephone.63  The Court held that the transactions 
occurred within Tennessee.64  Thus the Court ruled that Arkansas 
exceeded its power by mandating tax collection as the transactions the 
state sought to collect on occurred within another state.65  The Court 
recognized that there were distinct differences between sales and use 
taxes, as they are complementary and are attributed to two different 
purposes.66  Finally, the Court addressed the overall goal of the 
Commerce Clause in its limitation of each state’s powers over 
transactions not connected to that state.67 
McLeod’s sister case, General Trading Co., directly addressed the 
ability of states to compel retailers to collect use tax on behalf of its 
citizens.68  Iowa’s tax code included a provision requiring Iowan 
retailers to collect use tax from its residents.69  A Minnesota corporation 
employed traveling salesmen that solicited orders within Iowa.70  
Although these orders were solicited within Iowa, the technical state of 
purchase was Minnesota, where the contracts were executed.71  The 
Court held that Iowa was within its limits of the Constitution and the 
Commerce Clause as it was not discouraging to interstate commerce 
when it mandated the Minnesotan corporation to collect use taxes from 
Iowan residents.72   The Court also noted that it was common for states 
to impose tax collection duties on companies.73  Thus, states have the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See McLeod, 322 U.S. at 328–29. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 330. 
 67. See id. (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of 
free trade among the several States.”). 
 68. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (1944) 
(deciding whether Iowa may collect such a use tax from a Minnesota corporation). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 337. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 338 (citing Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940)). 
 73. See id. (citing Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93, 94 (1934)).  
Interestingly, Justice Jackson dissented from the majority opinion and declared, “The 
transaction of sale is not taxed and, being clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable. So 
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ability to mandate companies that meet the necessary conditions to 
collect sales and use taxes on behalf of the state.74 
Since these two decisions, the Supreme Court has heard four other 
cases addressing states’ abilities and limits to collect use tax.75  The 
Court eventually created a four-prong outline of the minimum criteria 
for a state to impose taxes on interstate activities.76  The Court applied 
the test to sales and use taxes collected by interstate companies.77 In 
1960, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, the Court found that independent 
contractors working as salesmen for an out-of-state company satisfied 
the substantial nexus requirement.78  In this case, a Georgia company 
utilized ten salesmen within the state of Florida who would send the 
orders made to Georgia to finalize the transaction.79  The Court held that 
there was no “constitutional difference” within the meaning of “physical 
nexus” between independent contractors and employees that were hired 
for sales solicitation.80  On the issue of whether a state could mandate a 
company to collect use tax, the Court in Scripto upheld its previous 
decision in General Trading Co. that such tax collection is permissible.81 
Seven years later, in 1967, the Court held in National Bellas Hess 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of State of Ill. 82  that if the only connection 
between the company and the state was a “common carrier or the United 
States mail” then that state lacked the power to mandate use tax 
collection on that company.83  A Missouri clothing retailer transacted 
with Illinois residents strictly by mail; the corporation would mail 
catalogs to customers in Illinois, who would mail their orders back to 
                                                                                                                 
we are holding that a state has power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no 
power to tax.” Id. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
 74. See id. at 338. 
 75. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298 (1992); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 76. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 287. 
 77. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 558. 
 78. See Scripto, Inc., 362 U.S. at 213. 
 79. See id. at 211. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 212 (citing Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 
338 (1944). 
 82. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), 
overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 83. Id. at 758. 
2013] INCREASING TAX COMPLIANCE 1101 
Missouri.84  The Court emphasized that the corporation had no other 
contacts with Illinois and further observed that this situation epitomized 
the focus of Commerce Clause protection as the relationship was 
“exclusively interstate in character.”85  While considering the 
constitutional implications of the use of U.S. mail and common carriers 
as a sufficient nexus, the Court held that the primary intention of the 
Commerce Clause was to maintain a national economy without the 
interference of “local entanglements” such as differences in tax rates 
among state and local governments.86 
A decade after National Bellas Hess, Inc., the Court created a four-
prong test in the 1977 case Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady that 
applied to all taxes that were to be imposed on interstate commerce 
activities.87  The first prong indicates that the “activity . . . [must be] 
sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax.”88  The second prong 
orders “that the tax . . . [must be] fairly related to benefits provided [to] 
the taxpayer,” and the third prong requires “that the tax [not] 
discriminate against interstate commerce.”89  Finally, the fourth prong 
mandates “that the tax is . . . fairly apportioned.”90  The Court 
constructed this test in response to a Mississippi tax directed at interstate 
commerce.91  Courts may rely on previous versions of the tax statute 
unless it results in “any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.”92  
The four-prong test has thus affected the constitutionality of the 
application of use tax collection by individual states.93  The Complete 
Auto Co. test has become the legal minimum criteria that must be met 
for a state to impose a tax on interstate activity.94  Thus, sales and use 
taxes imposed on companies in other states are subject to the same 
minimum criteria.95 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See id. at 754. 
 85. Id. at 759. 
 86. Id. at 759–60. 
 87. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 275. 
 92. Id. at 285 (citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 
U.S. 450 (1959)). 
 93. See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546, 2012 WL 1079175 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 
913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 2010). 
 94. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
 95. See id. 
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In that same year, the Supreme Court applied the new test in 
National Geographic Society v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization.96  National 
Geographic Society (“Society”), a D.C. corporation, had two offices 
located within the state of California that were strictly used to generate 
ads for its magazine.97  California sought to compel the Society to 
collect use tax from its consumers within the state.98  The Society 
maintained that California lacked the “nexus” needed to reach the 
corporation.99  The Court affirmed the California Supreme Court’s 
decision that the Society’s offices satisfied the nexus standard; however, 
the Court stressed that it had not adopted the “‘slightest presence’ 
standard of constitutional nexus” as put forth by the California Supreme 
Court.100  The Court then addressed the other three prongs of the 
Complete Auto Co. test, holding that they had been fulfilled.101 The 
Court found that a connection between the commercial transaction and 
the state and the actual “activity” of the company and the state was 
unnecessary.102 
D. THE FINAL WORD FROM THE SUPREME COURT: THE QUILL CASE 
In 1992, the most contemporary Supreme Court decision regarding 
sales and use tax, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,103  came before the 
Court.  North Dakota asserted that Quill Corp., a mail order business 
that did not own any property or have any employees working or 
residing within the state, was required to collect use tax from its 
customers residing within the state.104 The Court had the option of 
overruling National Bellas Hess, as North Dakota challenged the 
validity of the decision based on the Due Process Clause, believing the 
holding was outdated due to societal technological developments.105  
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 558 
(1977). 
 97. See id. at 552. 
 98. See id. at 553. 
 99. See id. at 554. 
 100. Id. at 556. 
 101. See id. at 558. 
 102. See id. at 560. 
 103. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 104. See id. at 303. 
 105. See id. at 301 (quoting State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 
208 (N.D. 1991)).  
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The Court acknowledged that although the due process case law had 
progressed within the last quarter century, the holding in National Bellas 
Hess continued to be good law because of its Commerce Clause 
analysis.106  The Court found that through its strict due process analysis, 
Quill would be subject to use tax collection because of the company’s 
actions “within” the state.107  However, the Court held that the 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Complete Auto and National Bellas 
Hess continued to be good legal precedent, and so Quill was not subject 
to the tax provision.108 
The Court distinguished the due process issues from the Commerce 
Clause issues by noting that due process analysis involves “fundamental 
fairness of governmental activity” while Commerce Clause analysis 
deals with the relationship between the states and the national 
economy.109  The Court upheld the National Bellas Hess decision by 
holding that Quill Corp.’s only connection with North Dakota was 
through common carriers, which did not fulfill the substantial nexus 
requirement portion of the Complete Auto test.110  The Court emphasized 
that, “[T]he bright-line rule of [the physical-presence requirement] of 
[National] Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce 
Clause” in that it relieves interstate companies from “undue burdens” of 
participating in the national economy.111  Although affirming its 
decisions in National Bellas Hess and Complete Auto, the Court invited 
Congress to take action on the parameters of use tax collection within 
the mail-order industry.112 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See id. at 307–11. 
 107. See id. at 308. 
 108. See id. at 314. 
 109. Id. at 312. 
 110. See id. at 317–19. 
 111. See id. at 314–15 (citing 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 102 (2012) (“Under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, state regulations cannot directly discriminate against 
interstate commerce, i.e., favor in-state over out-of-state economic interests. The 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the states from imposing restrictions that benefit 
in-state economic interests at out-of-state interests’ expense, thus reinforcing the 
principle of the unitary national market.”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 112. See id. at 318. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THREE THEORETICAL SCHEMES TO “FULFILL” THE 
CURRENT SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND THE CURRENT 
PRACTICES OF STATES TO COLLECT USE TAX 
Part II of this Note describes the current conflict between the 
theories behind the Amazon tax laws, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax, 
and Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme 
that purportedly fulfill the requirements of Quill and the application of 
the current use tax collection policies.  Subsection A describes the 
current Amazon tax laws that have been implemented, and illustrates the 
framework of Travis Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal and David 
Gamage and Devin Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation 
proposal.113  Subsection A also speculates on and analyzes the potential 
benefits and negative consequences of each theory.  Subsection B 
illustrates the current state efforts to have consumers report and pay 
their use taxes.  It also discusses the use of individual income tax 
returns, separate use tax returns, notification campaigns, the threat of 
penalties and availability of exemption periods, the improved 
relationship between the taxpayer and the states’ departments of 
revenue, and the advantages and disadvantages of each practice in 
collecting use taxes.114 
A. THEORETICAL METHODS OF CIRCUMVENTING THE SUBSTANTIAL 
PHYSICAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
Subsection A describes the current tax schemes and the tax scheme 
proposals’ attempt to abide by the current law as established in Quill.  
Subsection 1 provides a detailed illustration of Amazon tax laws.  
Subsection 2 discusses Travis Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal, 
and Subsection 3 describes David Gamage’s and Devin Heckman’s 
Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal.115 
1. Amazon Tax Laws 
“Amazon tax laws,” or affiliate nexus laws, are laws that certain 
states imposed in order to capture use taxes that have gone uncollected 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16; Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484.  
 114. See infra Part II.B. 
 115. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16. 
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in the past due to states’ previous inability to mandate tax collection on 
remote vendors such as Amazon.com.116  These laws are especially 
important due to the increased amount of shopping via e-commerce.117  
The increased amount of online shopping theoretically should not have 
had an effect on each state’s tax revenue since consumers have always 
been liable for the use tax on items they purchase online.118  E-
commerce companies, however, exploited a loophole for consumers; 
consumers are either unaware or refuse to report and pay the correct 
amount of use tax that they are historically liable for.119  There have 
been two types of “Amazon tax laws” passed by state legislatures.  
Currently seven states collect use taxes from Amazon through their 
“Amazon tax laws.”120  To prevent other states from implementing 
similar laws, Amazon entered into agreements with several states to 
establish physical ties in an attempt to postpone the collection of use 
taxes.121 
a. New York’s Amazon Tax Law: The Standard 
New York’s “Amazon tax law” has become the standard affiliate 
nexus law.122  The law establishes a nexus to remote vendors via in-state 
affiliate members.123  Affiliate members are those persons that contract 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See Gershel, supra note 5. These types of laws are known as “Amazon tax 
laws” because states have had a difficult time collecting use taxes on the large amount 
of purchases made through the retail website amazon.com. 
 117. See MAGUIRE, supra note 27, at 1. 
 118. See supra Part I.A. 
 119. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 339. 
 120. States Where Amazon Collects Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/12/us/states-where-amazon-collects-
taxes.html?ref=technology. 
 121. See Streitfeld, supra note 15. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 
129, 132–33 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 
2012) (“The statute . . . created a presumption that an out-of-state seller was soliciting 
business [in New York] through an independent contractor or other representative if the 
seller enters into an agreement with a resident of this state under which the resident, for 
a commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers, 
whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the seller, if the cumulative 
gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who are referred to the 
seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess of ten 
thousand dollars during the preceding  four quarterly periods ending on the last day of 
February, May, August, and November.”)). 
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with companies such as Amazon to promote certain products on the 
website.124  After consumers click the link on the affiliate’s website 
taking them to the vendor’s site, they can make a purchase; if this 
happens, the affiliate gets a percentage of the sale from the vendor.125 
Just two days after the New York tax law was signed into law in 
2008, Amazon filed suit alleging that the law was unconstitutional.126  
The company claimed that the law violated the Commerce Clause 
because Amazon did not have a physical connection with the state; 
Amazon claimed that the law also violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.127  The appellate court ultimately remanded the case 
for further discovery for the Commerce Clause and  
Due Process claims.128  Thus, New York State does not yet know if its 
Amazon tax law is constitutional.129 
b. Colorado’s Failed Amazon Tax Law 
Colorado’s unique e-commerce tax statute requires out-of-state 
retailers to notify customers of use taxes, send its customers an annual 
report on their total purchases in order for them to determine the 
appropriate amount of use tax, and send each customer’s annual report 
to Colorado’s Department of Revenue; this was challenged by a 
business association representing companies that generate business 
through the internet, mail order catalogs, and the like.130  The District 
Court for Colorado held that Colorado’s tax law discriminated against 
out-of-state vendors, putting them in the unpleasant situation of 
complying with the burdens of providing annual purchase reports to 
their customers or collecting the use tax for the state themselves.131  The 
court held that Colorado’s e-commerce statute violated the Court’s 
holding in Quill because it “impose[d] burdens on out-of-state retailers” 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See id. at 189–90. 
 125. See id. at 190. 
 126. See id. at 191. 
 127. See id. at 191–94. 
 128. See id. at 207–08. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546, 2012 WL 1079175, at *2 
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 131. See id. at *5–7. 
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that had no physical nexus with the state.132  As of now, Colorado has 
yet to mandate the collection of use tax from remote vendors.133 
c. Amazon’s Response to the Growing Trend of Amazon Tax Laws 
Amazon’s reaction to the passage of Amazon tax laws has ranged 
from litigation, making deals, to dropping its affiliate programs in 
certain states.134  As discussed below, Amazon has also responded by 
challenging the constitutionality of various Amazon tax laws and has, at 
times, been successful.135  Amazon has also entered into various deals 
with several states, forestalling the collection of sales taxes by agreeing 
to build warehouses or distribution centers, thereby creating a physical 
nexus within the state.136  These deals have been made with California, 
Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, South Carolina, and 
Virginia.137  These agreements may also further benefit Amazon by the 
issuance of tax breaks such as when South Carolina gave Amazon 
corporate tax breaks in exchange for it opening a warehouse in the 
state.138 Amazon has also simply cut its affiliate program in certain 
states as a result of the passing of affiliate nexus tax legislation.139  
Amazon has urged Congress to adopt a uniform sales tax law that would 
close the loophole created by Quill allowing remote vendors to sell 
products to consumers on a massive scale in states where they do not 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at *8. 
 133. See States Where Amazon Collects Taxes, supra note 120. 
 134. See Jim Brunner, States Fight Back Against Amazon.com’s Tax Deals, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/ 
2017895493_amazonsalestax03.html. 
 135. See Streitfeld, supra note 15. 
 136. See Brunner, supra note 134. 
 137. Robert W. Wood, Widespread Amazon and Internet Taxes Coming Soon, 
FORBES, June 17, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/ 
17/widespread-amazon-and-internet-taxes-coming-soon/.  Amazon began collecting 
taxes in California on September 15, 2012. Interestingly, a spike in purchases by online 
shoppers occurred in the period prior to the commencement of the tax collection by 
Amazon. See Chang, supra note 1. 
 138. See Brunner, supra note 134 (“When word emerged that Amazon.com was 
hunting for new warehouse sites, leaders in this business-friendly Southern state rolled 
out a welcome mat of tax breaks to lure the Internet retailer.  Code-naming their effort 
‘Project ASAP,’ South Carolina officials offered up more than $33 million in 
incentives, including free land, a property-tax cut and payroll-tax credits.”). 
 139. See Associates Program Operating Agreement, supra note 15 (deeming 
applicants from Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, and Rhode 
Island ineligible to participate in the program). 
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have substantial physical nexuses.140  The Marketplace Fairness Act, at 
the time of this publication, has been passed by the Senate and has yet to 
be voted on by the House of Representatives.141   
d. Potential Benefits of the Amazon Tax Laws 
There are benefits associated with implementing affiliate nexus 
laws.  The state has a guaranteed collection of its sales and use taxes.142  
While businesses that have physical nexuses and locations within the 
state must collect sales and use tax, remote vendors that meet the 
specifications within each state’s affiliate nexus laws will have to collect 
taxes as well.143  As many taxpayers are unaware of the existence of the 
use tax, the affiliate tax laws will increase the tax revenue currently 
coming into the state.144  The implementation of Amazon tax laws will 
also be more convenient for taxpayers.  Even if taxpayers are aware that 
there are use taxes applicable to purchases made online, it is still a 
cumbersome process to calculate the amount of use tax owed.145  If e-
commerce remote vendors calculate and collect the tax for consumers, it 
will mean less work for taxpayers during tax season. 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Tax Reform: What It Means For State And Local Tax And Fiscal Policy: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Paul Misener, 
Vice President of Global Public Policy, Amazon.com). 
 141. See S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013); Bill 
Summary & Status, 113th Congress, S.743, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d113:SN00743:@@@D&summ2=m& (“[The Market Place Fairness 
Act] [a]uthorizes each member state under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement (the multi-state agreement for the administration and collection of sales and 
use taxes, adopted on November 12, 2002) to require all sellers not qualifying for the 
small-seller exception (applicable to remote sellers with annual gross receipts in total 
U.S. remote sales not exceeding $1 million in the preceding calendar year) to collect 
and remit sales and use taxes for remote sales under the provisions of the Agreement, 
but only if such Agreement complies with the minimum simplification requirements 
relating to the administration of such taxes, audits, and streamlined filing set forth by 
this Act.”).  While the Marketplace Fairness Act has been passed by the Senate, there is 
speculation that the House will pass the bill. See David John Marotta, Marketplace 
Fairness Act Adds Automation to Tax Confusion, FORBES, May 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2013/05/12/marketplace-fairness-act-adds-
automation-to-tax-confusion/. 
 142. See Chang, supra note 1. 
 143. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 343–44. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See supra Part I.A. 
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e. Speculative Negative Effects of the Amazon Tax Laws 
Although the implementation of affiliate nexus laws may increase 
revenue for the states’ budgets, it may lead to less-than-ideal 
consequences.  These Amazon tax laws may be unconstitutional because 
of their attempt to get around Quill’s physical nexus requirement.146  
Alternatively, e-commerce companies may just end their affiliate 
programs, like Amazon did in Rhode Island.147  These laws may also 
prompt remote vendors to increase their prices for goods in order to deal 
with the increased cost of complying with sales tax reporting and 
collection duties.148  Finally, the enactment of Amazon tax laws does not 
solve the problem of use tax noncompliance.149 
At least one court has held that an affiliate nexus tax law is 
unconstitutional.  A Cook County Circuit Judge in Illinois struck down 
the Illinois affiliate nexus tax law on April 25, 2012.150   Judge Robert 
Lopez Cepero held that the Illinois law violated the Commerce 
Clause.151  This is currently the only court ruling on the constitutionality 
of an affiliate tax law, as the New York court has yet to rule on its own 
affiliate tax law.152  The continued implementation of affiliate tax laws 
may give rise to more challenges to the constitutionality of these types 
of laws.153 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See cases cited supra note 13. 
 147. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Drops More Affiliates to Avoid Tax, WALL 
ST. J., June 30, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124630810805070105.html. 
 148. See Austan D. Goolsbee, The Impact of Sales Tax on E-Commerce, CAPITAL 
IDEAS, Summer 2000, available at http://www.chicagobooth.edu/capideas/sum00/ 
goolsbee.html. 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
 150. Media Alert: Cook County Circuit Judge Robert Lopez Cepero Strikes Down 
“Amazon Tax” Law in Illinois, ILLINOIS POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.illinoispolicy.org/news/article.asp?ArticleSource=4813. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 
129, 145 (App. Div. 2010); Sean Craig, Click-Through Nexus Struck Down in Illinois, 
LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES, TAX LAW COMMUNITY (May 2, 2012, 8:54 AM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/taxlaw/blogs/taxstaff/archive/2012/05/02/illinoi
s-court-strikes-down-click-through-nexus.aspx. 
 153. See Amazon.com, LLC, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 145; Craig, supra note 152. 
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Many people shop online because of convenience and the potential 
for cheaper prices.154  Mandating that e-commerce companies calculate 
and collect sales tax in all forty-five jurisdictions that have such a tax 
creates an extra expense for these companies.155  The companies may 
have to increase prices in order to reflect this added expense.156  
Consumers may be discouraged from purchasing from these companies 
as the prices increase.157 
Making remote vendors responsible for collecting taxes that are 
already owed to the state does not fully solve the problem of the 
uncollected use tax.158  Consumers can and will still owe use tax on 
items that they buy over the Internet, but they will buy from companies 
that are not subject to the Amazon tax laws or make their purchases in 
other states.159  As the constitutionality of Amazon tax laws are 
uncertain, academics have sought to come up with proposals that would 
allow the state to impose the collection of taxes by out-of-state 
companies while simultaneously satisfying Quill.160 
2. Intermediary Tax 
Travis Cavanaugh presents one proposal to collect sales and use tax 
from remote vendors, specifically Internet retailers, through the creation 
of an Intermediary Tax.161  Cavanaugh’s tax scheme is similar to that of 
the affiliate nexus tax format; rather than establishing a substantial 
nexus with affiliates, however, the state establishes a substantial nexus 
with those vendors that use the Internet site as an intermediary, or 
forum, for facilitating their transactions.162  Thus, internet retailers, such 
as Amazon and eBay that provide “marketplaces” for residents of any 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Shopping Online: Convenience, Bargains, and a Few Scams, 
INVESTOPEDIA (July 12, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/buy-sell-
online.asp#axzz2NLydJO4f. 
 155. See Gamage & Heckman, supra note 16, at 484. 
 156. See Mazerov, supra note 45. 
 157. See Wells, supra note 2. 
 158. See Gershel, supra note 5, at 338–39. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 913 N.Y.S.2d 
129, 146 (App. Div. 2010); Craig, supra note 152. 
 161. See Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 581–83. 
 162. See id. 
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state, would have to collect the appropriate sales tax on the merchandise 
due to their relationship with these in-state vendors.163 
a. The Implementation of the Intermediary Tax 
Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax has two components necessary for 
implementation.164  The first is the definition of an “intermediary” and 
the second is the creation of a “rebuttable presumption” that a physical 
nexus exists between the company and the state if certain criteria are 
fulfilled.165  Cavanaugh offers an example definition of an intermediary 
by stating that it “should include any business that enters into 
agreements with residents of the state to provide a forum or service that 
allows in-state residents to sell their goods or merchandise in exchange 
for compensation.”166  The rebuttable presumption for establishing a 
sufficient substantial nexus that fulfills the Constitutional requirement 
for interstate commerce would be operative once the retailer earned a 
certain amount of revenue from in-state residents.167 
b. Potential Advantages to the Implementation of the Intermediary Tax 
There are four potential advantages associated with Cavanaugh’s 
Intermediary Tax:  a stronger substantial nexus, giving companies less 
legal room to avoid collecting taxes; an increased amount of companies 
would be affected and required to collect tax; and a tax more “directly 
related” to the intermediary activity rather than those of affiliates.168  
There is an argument that a stronger substantial nexus exists between 
sellers using remote vendor websites as forums for retail rather than as 
advertising agents.169  The argument is that there are more sellers than 
advertisers that have contracts with remote sellers to use their forum to 
sell goods.170  Also, intermediaries that are in the business of selling 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See id. at 583. 
 164. See id. at 582. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 583. 
 168. See id. at 583–87. 
 169. See id. at 583–84. 
 170. See id. at 584 (“Additionally, the revenue generated from intermediary 
contracts is likely to be much more significant than the revenue generated from 
affiliates in the state. Sales on the Amazon Marketplace accounted for thirty percent of 
total units sold on Amazon.”). 
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products online automatically have a sales or use tax responsibility, 
while affiliates do not.171  The second potential advantage is that remote 
vendors such as Amazon or eBay are not likely to stop providing a 
forum for their in-state sellers, since much of their bottom line comes 
from this service.172  Thus, the in-state sellers will continue to be able to 
utilize the remote vendors’ services.173  The third possible benefit would 
be that the retailers selling to customers directly would collect the tax 
rather than the company facilitating those transactions.174  Finally, as the 
intermediary tax is designed to have remote vendors collect sales tax on 
items that are actually sold from within the state (which would not be 
considered under the use tax since it is bought and sold within the same 
state), sales tax that should be collected in certain instances (when in-
state sellers sell to in-state buyers) will be guaranteed to be collected 
through this intermediary tax.175 
c. Potential Negative Aspects of the Intermediary Tax 
There are three potential negative consequences if an Intermediary 
Tax were to be implemented.176  The first potential issue is that it may 
not be constitutional; the similarity of Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax to 
the current affiliate nexus taxes makes its constitutionality 
questionable.177  Cavanaugh notes that contractual relationships between 
intermediaries and the remote vendor companies may not satisfy the 
Quill “substantial-nexus test.”178  He also makes the point that there may 
be a constitutional issue because the remote vendor is paid for 
facilitating a market for the intermediaries, while the consumers are 
compensating the intermediaries for the goods and not the remote 
vendors for their services of providing a market.179  Currently, the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 585. 
 173.  See id. 
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 175. See id. 
 176. See id. at 587. 
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affiliate-nexus tax statutes are dependent on the Scripto decision, in that 
the remote retailers contract with affiliates to “solicit sales for the 
retailer.”180  Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax scheme, however, cannot 
presume that the holding in Scripto will apply, as it is the in-state 
residents paying the remote vendor to use its services.181 
The second speculative negative aspect of an Intermediary Tax 
scheme is the impact on other more traditional marketplace forums.182  
The definition of any intermediary provided by Cavanaugh is not 
complete, but the basic foundation he recommends is not only specific 
to e-commerce.183  If legislators are not careful in drafting an 
intermediary tax law scheme, there is the potential that states will be 
able to mandate the collection of sales tax from other forums, such as 
shopping malls, flea markets, and green markets, rather than from the 
vendors that these facilitators accommodate within their marketplace.184   
Finally, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal may give a 
competitive advantage to those retailers who choose to have a store on 
eBay or Amazon rather than have a separate website as a retailer.185  As 
the intermediary would be responsible for collecting the sales and use 
taxes for the transactions, smaller retailers may choose to forego 
collecting sales tax on their own through their website in order to avoid 
costs, and transfer that duty to the remote vendor.186  Remote vendors 
would then acquire the original responsibility of that smaller retailer.187 
3. Adequate Vendor Compensation 
David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman offer another proposal to the 
affiliate nexus tax that aims to comply with Quill in the application of an 
“Adequate Vendor Compensation” scheme.188  Their proposal is 
dependent on an assumption that Quill stands for the prohibition of use 
tax collections that are burdensome on remote vendors and that if the 
remote vendors are adequately compensated for the burdens of use tax 
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collection, there would be compliance with the use tax law 
jurisprudence.189  Thus if a state employs an Adequate Vendor 
Compensation program to those remote vendors on which it seeks to 
impose use tax collection obligations, then the burdens on interstate 
commerce that concerned the Court in Quill should be alleviated.190 
a. Methods of Implementation 
Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme 
can be applied in various ways.191  To fully compensate remote vendors 
for their compliance with use tax collection mandates, the states would 
have to reimburse both fixed and variable costs associated with the 
remote vendors’ compliance.192  This basic principle applies to each of 
the proposed ways to implement an Adequate Vendor Compensation 
scheme.193  All costs must be refunded to the remote vendors in order to 
comply completely with Quill against burdening interstate commerce.194  
One of the first potential ways described by Gamage and Heckman to 
collect all of the costs associated with use tax collection compliance 
would be to apply a program similar to that used by Utah in 
compensating only for certain tax collection-related costs incurred by 
vendors.195  Utah compensates certain vendors for their outlays on tax 
collection tools such as computers and associated software.196  Another 
method offered by Gamage and Heckman would be to allow for those 
remote vendors that collect use taxes to retain a percentage of the tax 
money that they collected in order to cover the costs of that collection.197  
States that utilize this practice, such as Wyoming, find that this method 
is more practical to implement, but does not allow for the compensation 
of the specific amount of money outlaid by the vendor on the use tax 
collection.198 
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Gamage and Heckman believe that the most efficient system by 
which to reimburse these use tax compliance costs to remote vendors 
would be to use elements of both methods.199  By allowing vendors to 
either retain a certain percentage of the tax revenue they collect or 
demonstrate to the state’s department of revenue the amount that they 
outlaid on supplies for use tax collection, remote vendors would be 
given various options to get the sufficient amount of money to cover 
their compliance costs.200  To ensure that maximum compliance costs 
will be covered for the remote vendors, Gamage and Heckman believe 
experts should be employed to compute adequate rates.201  Remote 
vendors may be compensated at a certain rate depending on the amount 
of revenue they collect from in-state residents.202  Gamage and Heckman 
suggest that states implementing one of these potential schemes may 
choose to exempt certain remote vendors from collecting use taxes if the 
Adequate Vendor Compensation amount for that company proves to be 
more of a cost than a benefit.203 
b. Potential Advantages of the Adequate Vendor Compensation Plan 
There are a few potential advantages that could arise out of state 
implementation of Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor 
Compensation plan.204  One benefit would be the guaranteed collection 
of use taxes on most sales from remote vendors, which might remedy 
the problem of not collecting the use taxes from consumers.205  Another 
potential advantage would be that the Adequate Vendor Compensation 
plan might discourage remote vendors such as Amazon and eBay from 
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canceling their affiliate programs that also bring income into the state 
through income taxes.206  Gamage and Heckman also believe that the 
Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme would increase the likelihood 
that e-commerce purchase reporting statutes such as the one that 
Colorado attempted to implement will be upheld as constitutional.207  
They speculate that this is possible because the burden of providing the 
reports would be alleviated by compensating the companies which 
would relieve Commerce Clause issues.208  Lastly, the Adequate Vendor 
Compensation plan could incentivize states to create a more consistent 
tax system across state lines because states would want to minimize the 
costs associated with tax collection compliance.  Thus the more 
simplified tax system across states, the easier, and less costly, tax 
collection would be.209 
c. Potential Negative Aspects of the Adequate Vendor Compensation 
Plan 
The Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal is rooted in the 
assumption that states have the ability to fully compensate remote 
vendors for both tangible and intangible costs.210  Gamage and Heckman 
note that the adequate vendor compensation methods will most likely 
lead to the overcompensation of many remote vendors.211  While this 
may be true, these methods may lead to increased costs for the remote 
vendors, who would be forced to prove it through expert testimony.212  
Also, if a state employs the procedures that require verification of the 
purchases that are necessary for compliance, there is virtually nothing to 
stop companies from purchasing the best quality items, such as 
computers, and use them for other business practices on top of sales and 
use tax compliance.213  Overcompensation is problematic in that it may 
lead to the resentment of taxpayers who are essentially paying entities 
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who are not responsive to their wants and needs.214  On the other hand, 
under-compensation could induce increased prices for consumers by 
companies that are not reimbursed fully and need to find funds 
elsewhere.215 
Any of the various procedures recommended by Gamage and 
Heckman to implement an Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme will 
likely demand more resources for the states’ tax collection agencies, as a 
new system of collecting taxes would be implemented.216  The 
administration of these new procedures would likely require added 
funding.217  Gamage and Heckman also concede that their Adequate 
Vendor Compensation proposal may not stand should it reach the 
Supreme Court.218  They argue that there would not be an issue with 
Quill if the courts apply a modern economic analysis of the Commerce 
Clause, as the proposal seeks to eliminate burdens on interstate 
commerce for the remote vendor companies.219  However, as with any 
legal issue, the courts have the final say in the legitimacy of a state-
implemented Adequate Vendor Compensation scheme.220 
B. CURRENT COLLECTION METHODS AND TOOLS OF STATES THAT IMPOSE 
USE TAX 
Today there are forty-five states that impose sales and use taxes.221  
Presently, the most common way for these states to collect the tax is 
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through residents’ individual income tax returns.222  Of the forty-five, 
twenty-seven states provide the option for consumers to report use taxes 
through their individual income tax returns.223  The states also include 
pertinent use tax instructions within the associated tax booklet to the 
income tax returns.224  The remaining eighteen states require consumers 
that are liable for use tax to report through a separate use tax reporting 
form.225  More and more states are allowing taxpayers to fill out their 
individual income tax returns, and in relevant cases, their consumer use 
tax returns online. 
1. Reporting on Individual Income Tax Return 
Many states include a line for use tax on their individual income tax 
return forms in order to encourage use tax payment.226  Eleven of these 
states227 emphasize the use tax line by bolding the typeface, while one 
puts the text of the use tax line in red.228  The directions to fill out the 
use tax line vary from state to state, but most states incorporate a 
worksheet within the individual income tax reporting form instruction 
booklet.229  The use tax worksheet requires taxpayers to complete an 
equation to determine their use tax.230  The taxpayer must compute the 
total amount of goods and services purchased through the Internet, mail-
order catalogs, or in another state and multiply that amount by the 
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state’s tax rate (and in some cases the local jurisdiction’s tax rates as 
well).231  Then, the taxpayer would subtract the amount of sales tax that 
he or she had already paid on the purchase to obtain the total amount of 
use tax owed.232  Sometimes, these worksheets are not located within the 
individual income tax reporting instruction manual, but are located on 
other forms that the states’ departments of revenue provide.233 
As states have realized that consumers may not keep track of their 
purchases that are subject to use taxes, twelve states, by Manzi’s count, 
have presented an alternative to the use tax worksheets by providing 
lookup tables.234  These lookup tables allow taxpayers to determine the 
estimated amount of use tax owed through a chart that corresponds with 
their taxable income.235  The taxpayers simply find the bracket that 
designates their taxable income and look across the chart to determine 
the approximate amount of use tax owed.236  At least one state, 
Pennsylvania, even includes the use tax owed within jurisdictions with 
different tax rates.237  Although states encourage the taxpayer to report 
the amount of use tax owed on relevant purchases in addition to the 
amount found within the lookup table, many states will accept the 
lookup table amount as the total use tax liability owed.238  Most states, 
however, do require that the lookup tables only be used when the total 
amount of purchases subject to use tax is less than $1,000.239 
a. Benefits of Reporting on an Individual Income Tax Return 
States that collect income taxes are moving towards including a use 
tax line on the individual income tax returns to increase use tax 
compliance.240  There are a number of benefits to reporting the use tax 
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on a state’s individual income tax return.241  These advantages consist of 
taxpayer knowledge of the use tax and convenience.242  There are also 
benefits for including lookup tables as a tool for taxpayers, such as 
convenience and certainty.243 
The reason why use tax compliance is so low is that taxpayers are 
unaware that the tax exists or are unsure of what purchases are subject to 
use tax.244  One of the main benefits of including the use tax line on an 
individual income tax return is that taxpayers will become aware of the 
tax.245  By including the use tax line on the individual income tax return, 
the taxpayer will at least be able to choose whether or not to report his 
or her use tax owed.246  For those taxpayers that are not able to use the 
individual income tax return due to their large amount of purchases 
subject to use tax, they can continue to fill out the separate use tax 
return.247  By including the use tax line on the individual income tax 
return, it is more straightforward to taxpayers and makes it convenient 
for them to compute their total tax liability on one form.248  The 
inclusion of the use tax on the individual income tax return may also 
allow for fewer resources to be used, as a separate form becomes 
unnecessary. 
The lookup tables are beneficial because they provide even more 
convenience to taxpayers.  Taxpayers will be able to use the lookup 
tables to find an estimated amount of use tax liability based on their 
taxable income.249  This allows for taxpayers that have not kept accurate 
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records of their purchases subject to use tax to find an amount that 
approximates what their use tax should be.250  Taxpayers are more likely 
to choose to utilize the lookup tables rather than compute the use tax 
worksheet because it is less complicated and time-consuming.251  As 
taxpayers will presumably use the lookup tables to report their use tax 
liability, the states’ departments of revenue will have a more guaranteed 
stream of incoming tax revenue.252  The lookup table acts almost as a 
default for those taxpayers that have not kept correct records for their 
use tax computation.253  As a default, the states will have at least a 
minimum amount reported and collected from these taxpayers rather 
than nothing.254 
b. Disadvantages of This Form of Collection 
The disadvantages of adding the use tax line on the individual 
income tax return consist of the refusal of taxpayers to look up and 
complete the use tax worksheet within the instructions, as well as the 
inability for taxpayers that have purchased more than $1000 of goods 
and services subject to use tax to utilize the use tax line on the individual 
income tax return.255  The lookup tables also have drawbacks.  For some 
taxpayers, lookup tables may result in reporting more than they are 
liable for.256  From the perspective of the state, taxpayers may be 
reporting less use tax than they are liable for.257 
Furthermore, although the inclusion of the use tax line on the 
individual income tax return is more convenient than having to fill out a 
separate use tax return, the taxpayer may still choose not to complete the 
worksheet.  Those taxpayers who purchase many items or services 
subject to use tax will not be able to use their individual income tax 
return to report their use taxes.258  These taxpayers may choose not to fill 
out the separate use tax return as it is more inconvenient, or they may 
choose to under-represent their purchases in order to fill in the use tax 
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line on the individual income tax return.259  If these scenarios occur, the 
state may continue to lose tax revenue. 
Lookup tables have disadvantages for both taxpayers and the state.  
Although more convenient, taxpayers may not opt to utilize the lookup 
tables, as they may believe that the amount they owe according to the 
table is higher than it should be.260  If the taxpayers think that the table 
amount is too high, they may choose not to report any use tax at all.261  
On the other hand, when taxpayers utilize the lookup tables, they may be 
reporting and paying less than they actually owe in use tax.262  The 
states’ department of revenue will have lost the true amount of use tax 
that the taxpayer has owed.263 
2. Reporting on a Separate Use Tax Return 
Eighteen states require taxpayers to fill out a separate use tax 
return.264  Some of these states do not collect individual income taxes 
and therefore must collect the use tax through a consumer use tax 
return.265  Others states, however, require the use tax return in addition 
to the individual income tax return.266  The use tax return typically 
employs a worksheet that assists the taxpayer in computing their use tax 
liability.  The computation of the use tax is the difference between the 
sales tax that would apply in the applicable state and any sales tax that 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See James Alm et al., Taxpayer Information Assistance Services and Tax 
Compliance Behavior 5–7 (Tulane Univ., Economics Working Paper No. 1101, 2011); 
Govind S. Iyer et al., Increasing Tax Compliance in Washington State: A Field 
Experiment, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 20–26 (2010).  Although this study is about the 
collection of use tax for businesses, it can be assumed that the experiment would 
translate similarly for individuals. 
 260. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 7–9; see also Doran, supra 
note 246, at 146–49. 
 261. See Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax 
Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 27 (2009). 
 262. See Policy Brief from Nina Manzi, supra note 23, at 8–10. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. at 5. 
 265. See, e.g., Use Tax, DEP’T OF REVENUE, WASH. STATE, http://dor.wa.gov/ 
content/findtaxesandrates/usetax/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). 
 266. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 233; MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
supra note 230; Use Tax Form, S.D. DEP’T OF REVENUE (Nov. 2011) 
http://www.state.sd.us/drr2/businesstax/publications/taxfacts/UseTax-
Everyone%27s.pdf. 
2013] INCREASING TAX COMPLIANCE 1123 
was already paid at the time of purchase.267  The format of the worksheet 
is virtually the same as the worksheets given within the individual 
income tax return instructions.268  While some states only require an 
annual filing of a consumer use tax return, others, such as Tennessee, 
may allow for monthly or quarterly filing depending on the amount 
spent on goods and services subject to use tax.269 
a. Benefits of This Form of Collection 
The benefit of having a separate use tax return for states without 
income taxes is the ability to collect use taxes at all.  States without 
individual income taxes have limited alternatives in collecting use tax.270  
The only practical alternative in these states is to issue a separate use tax 
return.271  A separate use tax return may indicate to taxpayers that the 
use tax is important and that they are required to report and pay it.  By 
having its own return form, the use tax may be taken more seriously 
than if it had its own line on the individual tax return.  Consumers may 
also view the separate form as more compelling to fill out and return 
rather than the line that can easily be left blank or filled in with a zero on 
the individual income tax return.272 
b. Disadvantages of This Form of Collection 
There are some disadvantages associated with the separate use tax 
return.  These include the inconvenience of filling out another form, 
especially one for a tax that many taxpayers simply do not know 
exists.273  The separate form may also seem unimportant or irrelevant to 
the taxpayer.  Taxpayers may choose not to fill out the separate use tax 
form because they may believe that the tax amount is too insignificant 
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for the effort needed to fill out the form.274  Furthermore, the 
inconvenience may deter the taxpayer from filling out the form 
altogether.275  Taxpayers could also view the separate use tax return as 
something that is not applicable to them if they do not take the time to 
read it.  Some states, including Utah, have discontinued mailing their tax 
forms to taxpayers via postal service.276  If the taxpayer must go online 
or to an office to obtain tax forms, the taxpayer may not seek out the use 
tax return as he or she may be unaware of its existence or may just 
forget.277 
3. Notification of Use Taxes 
There are states within both categories of use tax collection that 
provide information about use taxes directly to taxpayers through their 
income tax booklets and other communications.278  These states usually 
have a higher compliance rate for use taxes.279  Notifications can come 
in various forms, from media campaigns to reminder letters in the mail, 
in order to create public awareness of the need to report use tax 
liability.280   An example of a state that has utilized both media and 
legislation for its use tax awareness campaign is Oklahoma.281  The 
Oklahoma Tax Commission aired a television commercial in 2010 
notifying consumers of their use tax liability when purchasing items 
online.282  The commercial features a couple talking about purchasing a 
television online.283  A man dressed in an elephant costume (as the 
“elephant in the room”) appears behind the couple and reminds them to 
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keep their receipt for the purchase, as they will owe use tax on the 
item.284  The couple seems to not be able to hear the elephant, and the 
wife then asks whether they will owe taxes on the purchase.285  The 
elephant, now resting in an armchair with a newspaper, responds that 
yes, they will have to pay use tax.286  The commercial cuts to a blue 
tinted screen with the words “Use Tax Funding” and listing various 
projects the tax will supposedly fund, including those projects for 
education, police, and fire.287  At the end of the commercial, the woman 
picks a peanut up off of the floor and scratches her head, puzzled.288  In 
2010, the Oklahoma legislature also passed a law that requires remote 
vendors to “provide notification on its retail Internet website or retail 
catalog and invoices provided to its customers that use tax is imposed 
and must be paid by the purchaser . . . .”289  The efforts to increase the 
awareness of the use tax were successful as the number of tax returns 
with use tax remittance increased from 2010–11.290 
There is also evidence that the increased notification of use tax 
penalties, as well as detection, creates better compliance.291  A 
Washington State study discovered that a mailing campaign designed to 
familiarize taxpayers with the ramifications of not paying taxes and 
details of detection efforts had an effect of higher use tax compliance.292  
The experiment measured use tax compliance based upon receipt of 
notification letters.293  Each participant received a letter either containing 
information about penalties for not reporting use tax, information on 
increased detection methods of not reporting use tax, both sets of 
information, or neither set of information.294  Participants in the study 
were not aware that they were involved in an experiment.295  The study 
found that participants who received the letters without the penalty or 
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detection notification had the lowest reported use tax base.296  The final 
results indicated that information regarding both detection and penalties, 
separately or together, influence taxpayer behavior.297 
a. Benefits of Notification of Use Taxes 
State campaigns to create awareness of use taxes have multiple 
benefits.  Taxpayers are unable to pay taxes on which they are not aware 
of.  A media or mailing campaign produces knowledge of the tax, and 
also reminds taxpayers that the tax is important to the state budget.298  
The notification of penalties and potential detection of tax evasion also 
prompts taxpayers to report use tax, as they are aware that the state is 
taking its collection seriously.299  The awareness campaign may also 
demonstrate to the taxpayer that their state department of revenue wants 
to aid the taxpayer in complying with the tax laws.300 
b. Disadvantages of the Notification of Use Taxes 
There are several disadvantages of a campaign to create awareness 
of use tax.  Taxpayers may already feel that they pay too many taxes.301  
Although the use tax has been incorporated in most states’ tax codes 
since the early twentieth century, most taxpayers are unaware of its 
existence.302  The campaign may spark feelings of resentment for the 
government.  Although more taxpayers will presumably comply with tax 
laws when they become aware of how to calculate the correct amount,303 
taxpayers are not necessarily ecstatic about parting with their hard 
earned money.  In addition, a notification campaign costs resources.  
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The effort will expend already scarce state resources.304  If the campaign 
is not successful, it may cost more than the revenue it seeks to collect. 
4. Penalties & Exemption Periods 
Many states employ penalties and interest for the noncompliance of 
reporting use tax liability.305  Historically these penalties have been 
implemented in order to deter people from evading their tax liability.306  
Some states, including Maine, have also implemented periods of 
exemption from these penalties and interest in order to incentivize 
taxpayers to comply with use tax reporting requirements.307  As with 
most taxes, if a taxpayer does not report or pay his or her taxes within 
the given period, penalties and interest accrue on the amount owed.308  
Many taxpayers are unaware of the possibility of penalties and 
interest.309  States rely on penalties and interest of inaccurate or late tax 
payments as a part of their revenue.310  However, many taxpayers resent 
that they must pay even more money to the government if they do not 
calculate their taxes correctly or file their returns late.311 
An exemption period is a length of time designated by a state 
within which taxpayers will not be penalized with interest and penalties 
if they report and pay their use tax.312  In Maine, these exemption 
periods may last one month or two.313  Again, usually states allow for 
taxpayers to report and pay their use tax online.  
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a. Benefits of Penalties & Exemption Periods 
The implementation of penalties and interest on the use tax may 
have beneficial consequences.  The threat of penalties may deter some 
taxpayers from not reporting their use tax liability inaccurately or 
untimely.314  While penalties may not be advantageous to the individual 
taxpayer, they tend to add more revenue to the state’s budget.315  Either 
way the state gains in that its revenue base increases when taxpayers 
owe penalties or pay their correct amount of liability.316  Exemption 
periods may also be beneficial.  Taxpayers may take advantage of 
exemption periods rather than risk the chance of owing penalties and 
interest on their inaccurate tax return.317  The exemption period may also 
demonstrate to the taxpayer that the state does not want to punish the 
consumer for something that he or she has not been aware of.318  As a 
result, exemption periods may generate a better image for the state’s 
department of revenue.319  The improved impression of the department 
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of revenue may ease the taxpayers’ pains of paying their taxes and 
increase compliance.320 
b. Disadvantages of Penalties & Exemption Periods 
Penalties and interest accrued on inaccurate use tax liability may 
also have negative consequences.  The taxpayers may view penalties on 
use tax as another unwarranted seizure of their income.321  As a result, 
the taxpayers may spite states’ departments of revenue by not reporting 
the correct use tax liability.322  Even if there is a deterrence effect, the 
penalty may not be able to encourage correct use tax liability because 
taxpayers may have difficulty computing the accurate amount of use tax 
they owe.323  Penalties are only available pursuant to an audit on the 
individual.324  The state cannot audit every taxpayer annually, and 
taxpayers may risk the penalty in order to pay lower use tax liability.325 
Exemption periods have potential negative consequences as well.  
When penalties and interest are waived, there is a loss of income from 
that stream of revenue.326  If the exemption period is not successful in 
incentivizing more taxpayers to come forward and report their correct 
use tax liability, the state may lose money that it could have gained from 
the penalties at that time.327  Exemption periods may also demonstrate 
that taxpayers in general are not reporting or paying their correct amount 
of use tax liability.328  When taxpayers believe that others are cheating 
the system, they lose motivation to pay their taxes.329  Thus, exemption 
periods may in fact discourage the correct use tax liability reporting and 
payment. 
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c. De Minimis Exemptions 
At least three states have unique exemptions for taxpayers who 
spend less than a certain amount of money on items subject to use tax.330  
These are called de minimis exemptions.331  Although the de minimis 
exemption is beneficial to individual taxpayers that do not purchase 
many items subject to use tax, the state loses revenue by waiving the use 
tax liability on these purchases.332  The limit to the total amount of 
purchases subject to the de minimis exemption varies from state to 
state.333  This exemption may also have other restrictions, such as the 
purchases may only be from a mail-order catalog.334  It is beneficial to 
taxpayers that do not purchase many items subject to use tax.  It also 
encourages taxpayers to limit their spending on items outside of the state 
in order to promote in-state business.  The de minimis exemption, 
however, does retract from the revenue base in that the state does not 
collect the tax that would be applicable had the exemption not existed.335 
5. Relationship between Taxpayer and the States’ Departments of 
Revenue 
Finally, there is a theory that compliance with the tax code will 
increase when there is a positive relationship between the taxpayer and 
the department of revenue.336  A positive impression of the department 
of revenue reassures the taxpayer that their taxes are being put to good 
use.337  Positive relationships between the taxpayer and department of 
revenue may be obtained by reminding taxpayers what projects their 
taxes are funding, as well as increasing personal interaction between 
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department of revenue employees and taxpayers.338  The ability to seek 
assistance from the department of revenue in computing tax also 
increases the department’s reputation.339  The departments of revenue 
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by trying to better their 
relationship with the taxpayers. 
III. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT A COMBINATION OF CURRENT 
PRACTICES TO MAXIMIZE USE TAX COLLECTION WITHOUT HAVING 
TO CREATE NEW TAX COLLECTION SCHEMES 
To rectify the current e-commerce use tax crisis, states should 
implement the tools that they currently have in a more efficient 
manner.340  States currently have the ability to collect more use tax 
without sidestepping the law.  Rather than attempt to dodge the law 
established in Quill by implementing Amazon tax laws or other 
alternatives,341 states should implement a combination of the current 
practices that are already in place.342  By utilizing existing resources, 
there will be no chance for a new Amazon tax law to be overturned and 
it would be unnecessary to invest in the creation of an extended 
bureaucracy.343  The use of these tools will also preserve the 
responsibility of the consumer to report and pay use tax.344  Remote 
vendors already are subject to sales taxes where they have substantial 
physical nexuses.345  While remote vendors cannot advertise that their 
services and items are not subject to tax, they do not have the duty to 
collect use tax.346 
The states’ departments of revenue should raise awareness of the 
use tax, its applicability, and the penalties associated with the inaccurate 
filing of use tax through various means.347  Some states may prefer to 
send out mailings or pamphlets, while others may choose to create 
public service announcements through the radio or commercials on 
                                                                                                                 
 338. See id. at 27–33. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See supra Part II.B. 
 341. See supra Part II.A. 
 342. See supra Part II.B. 
 343. See supra Part II. 
 344. See supra Part II.B. 
 345. See supra Part I.C. 
 346. See supra Part I.C. 
 347. See supra Part II.B. 
1132 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
television.348  The states that have income tax but still require taxpayers 
to file a consumer use tax return should consider adding a use tax line on 
the individual income tax return.349  States that utilize either the 
individual income tax return or use tax return should evaluate 
implementing lookup tables in order to increase use tax liability 
reporting.350  The creation of a better taxpayer-department of revenue 
relationship can also increase use tax compliance.351 
A. REASONS WHY THE AMAZON TAX LAWS & INTERMEDIARY TAX 
PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED 
The utilization of the current practices are better than the Amazon 
tax laws and Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax proposal for a number of 
reasons.  The implementation of the Amazon tax laws and Cavanaugh’s 
Intermediary Tax proposal may generate litigation costs as challenges to 
the constitutionality of these tax schemes continue to occur.352  There 
have been at least two states in which a challenge to an Amazon tax law 
has been litigated, and there is at least one court that has held that the 
state’s Amazon tax law unconstitutional.353  Continued challenges will 
cost an enormous amount of resources in litigation.354  The possibility 
that the tax scheme is in fact unconstitutional further raises the costs of 
implementation.355  Even if the Amazon tax laws or Cavanaugh’s 
Intermediary Tax scheme proposal survive constitutional challenges, the 
state will have to spend money to increase the departments of 
revenue.356  As more companies become liable under the proposed tax 
scheme, the state will be required to allocate more resources to the 
departments of revenue to collect and dispense the tax to the state.357  
Remote vendor companies may also react by terminating their affiliate 
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programs, as Amazon did in the state of Rhode Island, creating less 
revenue for the state by eliminating a source of income tax.358 
B. REASONS WHY THE ADEQUATE VENDOR COMPENSATION PROPOSAL 
SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED 
Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation 
proposal will require an extraordinary amount of resources.359  This is so 
because the departments of revenue will need to ensure that remote 
vendors are fully compensated for their tax collections services.360  
Under the proposed compensation scheme, the departments of revenue 
will require resources and staff to establish a new system to determine 
the costs attributed to remote vendors, especially those remote vendors 
who can prove expenditures with invoices.361  Also, because Gamage’s 
and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal requires that 
remote vendors be overpaid to ensure that they are fully compensated, 
there will be more resources allocated to the remote vendors rather than 
to the budget.362  Again, the Adequate Vendor Compensation proposal is 
founded in the idea that adequate compensation of remote vendors will 
satisfy the law required in Quill, which may not be true.363 
C. WHY CURRENT PRACTICES SHOULD BE EMBRACED AND UTILIZED 
Research suggests that most taxpayers are unaware of use taxes and 
their own potential use tax liability.364  Similarly, other reports 
demonstrate that when taxpayers know that they owe these types of 
taxes and are aware of the associated penalties, they comply by 
reporting their liability.365  Mailings and public service announcements 
are once-a-year investments.366  The change to include the use tax 
liability on the individual income tax will result only in the nominal cost 
required to create a new form and instruction booklet, while eliminating 
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the extra cost of creating a separate use tax return.367  While the state 
will have to invest in the creation of lookup tables, the payoff is 
increased compliance.368  As many of these practices are already utilized 
to some extent, the need to expand the bureaucracy within each state’s 
department of revenue will be minimal.369  In addition, the state will 
avoid litigation costs by implementing practices that are unquestionably 
constitutional.370  In regards to Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate 
Vendor Compensation proposal, taxpayers will feel uncomfortable 
knowing that remote vendors, including large corporations, receive more 
compensation than they are entitled to.371   
Although the Amazon tax laws, Cavanaugh’s Intermediary Tax 
proposal, and Gamage’s and Heckman’s Adequate Vendor 
Compensation proposal result in the guaranteed collection of sales tax 
from its residents who may not have reported their use tax, the risk 
associated with the constitutionality and cost of the implementation of 
these theories is not worth the potential increase in revenue.372  The state 
can increase use tax compliance through methods that are not as 
resource dependent and are definitely constitutional.373  By employing 
the practices described in Section B in a way that optimizes use tax 
awareness as well as creating easier ways for taxpayers to calculate their 
use tax, such as lookup tables, states will be able to increase their 
revenue base while abiding by the law.374 
The burden to report and pay use tax has always been on the 
consumer.375  The collection of use taxes by remote vendors will not 
eliminate use tax liability reporting on the part of the consumer.376  Use 
taxes are applicable not only to online purchases and mail-order catalog 
purchases, but also to purchases that were made physically within 
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another state.377  Thus, although the collection of use taxes by remote 
vendors may increase the amount of use taxes being collected by states, 
individual use tax liabilities will still exist.378  The consumer is the only 
party, with the exception of the state during an audit, who can calculate 
how much use tax is owed to the state.379  The responsibility to report 
the accurate amount of use tax rests on the consumer, not the companies 
outside of the state with which they choose to do business.380 
CONCLUSION 
It is unnecessary for state legislatures to resort to the creation of tax 
schemes such as the Amazon tax laws to increase use tax compliance.  
Presently, the states have access to tools and practices that have the 
ability to increase use tax compliance.381  The Amazon tax law schemes 
and the proposed alternatives are not solutions for the problem of use tax 
noncompliance.382  Even if these proposed methods prove to be 
constitutional and available to states for aid in use tax collection, 
taxpayers will continue to owe use tax through their purchases within 
other states and from purchases through e-commerce, which does not 
conform to the criteria put forth in the proposed tax schemes.383  There is 
no need to create expensive, complex tax law schemes to fulfill 
obligations that are already placed on consumers.384  The states are able 
to use cost-effective tools that have proven to work in general tax 
compliance.385  The solution to create higher use tax compliance is to 
utilize the existing tools already in place today rather than invest in 
overly risky and costly tax schemes that attempt to bypass the current 
law.386 
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